During my first term, I restricted the entry of certain foreign nationals into the United States to prevent threats to national and public security from reaching our borders. The Supreme Court upheld these restrictions. I reinstated these successful policies through Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other Threats to National and Public Security) and Proclamation 10949 of June 4, 2025 (Restricting the Entry of Aliens to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other Threats to National and Public Security).
It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who attempt to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national and public security, incite hate crimes, or otherwise exploit immigration laws for malicious purposes.
The United States must exercise extreme vigilance during visa and immigration processes to identify, prior to their admission or entry into the country, foreign nationals who intend to harm Americans or our national interests. The U.S. government must ensure that admitted foreign nationals do not intend to threaten its citizens; undermine or destabilize its culture, government, institutions, or founding principles; or defend, aid, or abet designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
To protect our nation, as provided by Executive Order 14161, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, identified countries worldwide whose screening and background checks were so deficient as to warrant the partial or total suspension of the admission of their citizens, pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). Accordingly, through Proclamation 10949, I restricted entry into the United States for foreign nationals from countries with deficient screening and background checks to protect the national and public security of the United States and its population. The proclamation also directed the U.S. government to immediately collaborate with the countries identified in the proclamation on the steps to be taken to comply with U.S. screening, background check, immigration, and security requirements.
Despite these commitments, most of the countries identified in Proclamation 10949, as well as others, continue to exhibit serious deficiencies in screening, verification, and information reporting. At least one country lacks mechanisms in hospitals to ensure that births are reported, and widespread corruption, combined with a general lack of verification and poor record-keeping, prevents any foreign national from obtaining any civil document from that country, especially if they are willing to pay a fee or hire a professional specializing in this type of fraud. In that same country, law enforcement records are not maintained with the accuracy and consistency necessary to provide the U.S. government with a representation of individuals’ criminal histories. In another country, civil documents, such as marriage licenses and birth certificates, are handwritten and stamped on plain paper, making them highly susceptible to alteration, and a market for fraudulent documents produces all kinds of forged records, making written verification of any visa application virtually impossible. In yet another country, criminal records are generally unreliable and inaccessible. In another country, U.S. visas are used as a tool for the illicit cross-border movement of assets by corrupt government officials and organized crime groups. Corruption in yet another country extends even to the national school system, which in the past has provided falsified diplomas and grade information to fraudsters attempting to obtain student visas and access lucrative athletic scholarships. The government of another country refuses to provide passport samples, undermining the U.S. government’s ability to detect fraudulent documents. In yet another country, the population largely does not formally document life events. This makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to effectively verify basic biographical data such as birth dates, marriages, and parentage. Such countries justify the continuation or imposition of new travel restrictions.
Furthermore, after continuing their review, and in light of the experience gained since the issuance of Proclamation 10949 and the reaction of foreign countries to that proclamation, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have identified additional countries that cannot meet the basic criteria for identifying their nationals and residents who pose threats to national and public security, nor for sharing information with the United States. For example, only 40 percent of one country’s territory is under full government control, and its officials have indicated that its capacity to securely process, house, or monitor aliens is limited. In another country, corruption in various forms is widespread. Other countries have been the target of successful efforts to overthrow or weaken their governments, resulting in radical terrorist groups operating with minimal or no interference from law enforcement, engaging in forced labor, sex trafficking, the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs, and other activities that destabilize those countries. And, due to poor documentation practices and corrupt governments in these countries, there may be little guarantee that foreign nationals from these countries seeking to come to the United States on immigrant or nonimmigrant visas are not bringing these criminal enterprises with them.
According to U.S. law enforcement reports, foreign nationals from the countries listed in this proclamation have been involved in crimes such as murder, terrorism, embezzlement of public funds, human trafficking, and other criminal activities. Many of these countries are among the countries with the highest crime rates, and the unreliability of foreign civil documents and the lack of trustworthy criminal information make it extremely difficult for U.S. investigative and background check authorities to assess prior criminal activity and other grounds for inadmissibility.
Finally, some of these countries have offered Citizenship by Investment (CBI) without residency, which complicates vetting and background checks. For example, a foreign national from a country subject to travel restrictions could obtain a Citizenship by Investment (CBI) from a second country not subject to travel restrictions, obtain a passport with the citizenship of that second country, and subsequently apply for a U.S. visa to travel to the United States, thus circumventing the travel restrictions of their first country. Furthermore, U.S. authorities and the State Department have noted that, historically, CBI programs have been exposed to various risks. These risks include allowing an individual to conceal their identity and assets to evade travel, financial, or banking restrictions.
Foreign nationals from the countries described above have also exploited the historical generosity of the United States and violated our country’s immigration laws by failing to comply with the terms of their nonimmigrant or immigrant visas. As cited in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Overstay Entry/Exit Report, foreign nationals from many countries exhibit high rates of overstaying their nonimmigrant visas. These overstays and other abuses flagrantly violate U.S. immigration laws, despite the generous incentives offered by my Administration, such as the option to self-deport through the CBP Home app. To fully comply with U.S. immigration law, the flow of foreign nationals from countries with high rates of overstaying their visas or significant fraud must cease.
Furthermore, the implementation of Proclamation 10949 recommends limiting the categorical exceptions described therein to prevent exploitation by foreign nationals. For example, immigrant visas for relatives of individuals in the United States will no longer be a broad categorical exception. As described above, the countries to which this proclamation applies have persistent and chronic deficiencies in background investigations that impede conclusive admissibility determinations and are easily exploitable to threaten U.S. national and public security. These deficiencies include poor documentation and civil registration practices, widespread corruption and fraud, unreliable or inaccessible criminal records, and unreliable government travel documents. These pervasive risks to nationals of the covered countries apply at least as strongly to family-based visa applications—which comprise the majority of immigrant visa applications from such countries—and potentially even more strongly. Family ties can serve—and, indeed, have served in the past, according to concrete information provided by U.S. law enforcement and the State Department—as unique vectors for fraudulent, criminal, or even terrorist activities, through means such as the domestic or international financing of such activities. Broadly excluding the majority of immigrant visa applicants from countries whose risks and deficiencies pose the most serious threat to the United States is inconsistent with protecting our national security and with the purpose of encouraging greater cooperation and improved background checks by these specific countries. This is particularly true given the large number of individuals granted U.S. immigration status during the previous administration without sufficient documentation or established vetting mechanisms, whose relatives could exploit this exception, just as criminals have exploited family-based visas in the past. Accordingly, it determined that the risks to the classes of aliens covered by this proclamation cannot be satisfactorily mitigated without addressing the specific prevailing concerns of each country, and that any extraordinary cases can be adequately addressed through the national interest exceptions provided in this proclamation and Proclamation 10949.
As a result of these reviews and considerations, it decided, as described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation, to continue imposing and modifying the limitations established in sections 2 and 3 of Proclamation 10949 on the entry into the United States of certain categories of aliens. It also decided, as described in sections 4 and 5 of this proclamation, to impose the limitations set forth below on the entry into the United States of certain other categories of aliens.
THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, do hereby determine that, without the application of the measures set forth in this proclamation, the entry into the United States of immigrants and nonimmigrants of the persons described in sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. Therefore, I do hereby proclaim the following:
Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other threats to national and public security. Screening and background check protocols and procedures related to visa and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing this policy. These protocols and procedures enhance our ability to identify foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or abet acts of terrorism, or who otherwise pose a security threat, and contribute to our efforts to prevent such foreign nationals from entering the United States.
(b) The identity management and information-sharing standards and practices of foreign governments affect the effectiveness of U.S. screening and background check protocols and procedures. Foreign governments manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents. They also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals and residents to other governments, including information about known and suspected terrorists and criminals.
Therefore, it is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate measures to encourage foreign governments to improve their identity management and information-sharing protocols and procedures and to regularly share their identity and threat intelligence with U.S. screening and background check systems.
(c) Proclamation 10949 directed the United States government to completely restrict and limit the entry of nationals from the following 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The proclamation directed the United States government to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals from the following 7 countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. In addition, the proclamation directed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to immediately contact each of the countries identified in the proclamation regarding the steps they should take to comply with U.S. screening, background check, immigration, and security requirements.
(d) Proclamation 10949 directed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, outlining their assessment and recommending whether the suspensions and limitations imposed by the proclamation should continue, be terminated, modified, or supplemented.
(e) The Secretary of State, along with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, submitted the report described in subsection (d) of this section, recommending that the entry restrictions and limitations for aliens from several countries continue to be enforced. The report also identified other countries whose verification and selection information is so deficient that it warrants the full or partial suspension of their admission. These recommendations are based on the collaboration with foreign countries that I instructed in Proclamation 10949.
(f) In evaluating the Secretary of State’s recommendations and determining whether and to what extent restrictions should be imposed on each country, or whether to continue imposing them, I consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the appropriate Presidential Assistants, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives. In addition, I considered various factors, including each country’s investigative and background-checking capabilities, information-sharing policies, and country-specific risk factors, including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its overstay rate, and its cooperation in accepting the return of its nationals subject to deportation. Each of these factors, including overstay rates, was only one of those considered in making the decisions in this proclamation, which are based on the totality of each country’s circumstances after a review of all relevant factors.
I also considered the different risks posed by foreign nationals admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas. Individuals admitted on immigrant visas are, or may become, lawful permanent residents of the United States. These immigrant visa holders may present national or public security concerns that may differ from those of individuals admitted as nonimmigrants. The United States grants lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after national or public security concerns arise, which increases costs and exacerbates the risk of errors associated with admitting these individuals. And while immigrants are generally subject to more thorough background checks than nonimmigrants, such checks are far less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate identity management or information-sharing policies, or otherwise poses risks to U.S. national or public security.
I analyzed these factors and evaluated these objectives, paying particular attention to developing country-specific restrictions. This approach was designed to foster cooperation with the relevant countries, recognizing the unique circumstances of each. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or admission of aliens about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the country. These restrictions and limitations are necessary to obtain the cooperation of foreign governments, including reducing the rates of overstay of their nationals; enforcing our immigration laws; and promoting other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives. Under the present circumstances, without the restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation, the entry or admission of such aliens would be detrimental to the national interest.
(g) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after considering the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have decided to maintain the total restriction and limitation on entry of nationals from the following 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These restrictions distinguish between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants, but apply to both.
(h) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after considering U.S. foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives, I have decided to restrict and fully limit the entry of nationals from seven additional countries: Burkina Faso, Laos, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Syria. These restrictions distinguish between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants, but apply to both. I have also decided to restrict and fully limit the entry of individuals using travel documents issued or endorsed by the Palestinian Authority (PA).
(i) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after considering U.S. foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives, I have decided to maintain the partial restriction and limitation on the entry of nationals from the following four countries: Burundi, Cuba, Togo, and Venezuela. I have also decided to modify the partial restriction and limitation on the entry of nationals from Turkmenistan. These restrictions distinguish between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants, but apply to both.
(j) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after considering the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have decided to restrict and partially limit the entry of nationals of the following 15 countries: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tonga, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These restrictions distinguish between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants, but apply to both.
(k) Sections 4 and 5 of this proclamation describe some of the deficiencies in identity management and information sharing that led me to impose, or continue to impose, the restrictions described in this proclamation. These deficiencies are sufficient to justify my conclusion that unrestricted entry of nationals of the aforementioned countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. However, the public disclosure of additional details upon which I relied in making these determinations would seriously jeopardize U.S. national security, and many of these details are classified information.
Section 2. Continued Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Identified Countries of Concern. Entry into the United States by nationals of the following countries continues to be suspended and limited as established in Proclamation 10949 and herein, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case exemptions described in section 6 of this proclamation:
(a) Afghanistan;
(b) Burma;
(c) Chad;
(d) Republic of the Congo;
(e) Equatorial Guinea;
(f) Eritrea;
(g) Haiti;
(h) Iran;
(i) Libya;
(j) Somalia;
(k) Sudan; and
(l) Yemen.
Section 3. Continued Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern. Entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries continues to be suspended and limited as established in Proclamation 10949 and herein, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case exemptions described in section 6 of this proclamation:
(a) Burundi;
(b) Cuba;
(c) Togo; and
(d) Venezuela.
Section 4. Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern. Entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is suspended and restricted, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case exemptions described in section 6 of this proclamation:
(a) Burkina Faso
(i) According to the Department of State, terrorist organizations continue to plan and conduct terrorist activities throughout Burkina Faso. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Fiscal Year 2024 Overstay Entry/Exit Report (the “Overstay Report”), Burkina Faso had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.16 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 22.95 percent. Furthermore, Burkina Faso has historically refused to accept the return of its citizens subject to deportation.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burkina Faso as immigrants and as non-immigrants is totally suspended
(b) Laos
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Laos had an overstay rate of 28.34% for B-1/B-2 visas and 11.41% for F, M, and J visas. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Fiscal Year 2023 Overstay Report (“2023 Overstay Report”), Laos had an overstay rate of 34.77% for B-1/B-2 visas and 6.49% for F, M, and J visas. Furthermore, Laos has historically not accepted the return of its citizens subject to deportation.
(ii) The admission of Laotian nationals to the United States as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended in its entirety.
(c) Mali
(i) According to the Department of State, armed conflict between the Malian government and armed groups is common throughout the country. Terrorist organizations operate freely in certain areas of Mali.
(ii) Entry into the United States of Malian nationals as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended in its entirety.
(d) Niger
(i) According to the Department of State, terrorists and their sympathizers are planning kidnappings in Niger and could attack anywhere in the country. According to the Overstay Report, Niger recorded an overstay rate of 13.41% for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 16.46% for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) Entry into the United States of Nigerien nationals as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended in its entirety.
(e) Sierra Leone
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had an overstay rate of 16.48% for B-1/B-2 visas and 35.83% for F, M, and J visas. According to the 2023 Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had an overstay rate of 15.43% for B-1/B-2 visas and 35.83% for F, M, and J visas. Furthermore, Sierra Leone has historically refused to accept the return of its citizens subject to removal.
(ii) The admission of Sierra Leonean nationals to the United States as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended in its entirety.
(f) South Sudan
(i) According to the Overstay Report, South Sudan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 6.99% and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 26.09%. Furthermore, South Sudan has historically refused to accept the return of its deported citizens.
(ii) The admission of South Sudanese nationals to the United States, both as immigrants and nonimmigrants, is hereby suspended in its entirety.
(g) Syria
(i) Syria is emerging from a prolonged period of social instability and internal conflict. While the country is working to address its security challenges in close coordination with the United States, Syria still lacks an adequate central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and lacks adequate vetting and screening measures. According to the Overstay Report, Syria had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 7.09% and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 9.34%.
(ii) The admission of Syrian nationals to the United States as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended in its entirety.
(h) Palestinian Authority Documents
(i) Several U.S.-designated terrorist groups are actively operating in the West Bank or Gaza Strip and have murdered U.S. citizens. In addition, the recent war in these areas has likely compromised vetting and screening capabilities. In light of these factors, and considering the limited or nonexistent control exercised by the Palestinian Authority over these areas, individuals attempting to travel with travel documents issued or endorsed by the Palestinian Authority cannot currently be properly vetted or approved for entry into the United States.
(ii) Entry into the United States is hereby suspended entirely for foreign nationals seeking to travel with any travel document issued or endorsed by the Palestinian Authority, whether as immigrants or nonimmigrants.
Section 5. Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern. The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is suspended and restricted as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case exemptions described in section 6 of this proclamation:
(a) Angola
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Angola had an overstay rate of 14.43 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 21.92 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Angolan nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Angolan nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(b) Antigua and Barbuda
(i) Antigua and Barbuda has historically had non-resident CBI.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Antigua and Barbuda as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Antigua and Barbuda to the extent permitted by law.
(c) Benin
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Benin had an overstay rate of 12.34 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 36.77 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Benin nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to Benin nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(d) Côte d’Ivoire
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Côte d’Ivoire had an overstay rate of 8.47 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 19.09 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Côte d’Ivoire as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Côte d’Ivoire to the extent permitted by law.
(e) Dominica
(i) Dominica has historically had non-resident CBI.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Dominica as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Dominica to the extent permitted by law.
(f) Gabon
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Gabon had an overstay rate of 13.72 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 17.77 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The admission to the United States of Gabonese nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Gabonese nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Gambia
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Gambia had an overstay rate of 12.70% for B-1/B-2 visas and 38.79% for F, M, and J visas. Furthermore, Gambia has historically refused to accept the return of its citizens subject to removal.
(ii) The admission to the United States of Gambian nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Gambian nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(h) Malawi
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Malawi had an overstay rate of 22.45 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 31.99 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The admission to the United States of Malawian nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Malawian nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(i) Mauritania
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Mauritania had an overstay rate of 9.49 percent for B-1/B-2 visas. According to the State Department, the Government of Mauritania has a limited presence in certain areas of the country, which significantly hinders vetting and background checks.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Mauritanian nationals as immigrants and nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers will reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Mauritanian nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(j) Nigeria
(i) Radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State operate freely in certain areas of Nigeria, which significantly hinders vetting and background checks. According to the Overstay Report, Nigeria had an overstay rate of 5.56% for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 11.90% for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Nigerian nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to Nigerian nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(k) Senegal
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Senegal had an overstay rate of 4.30 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 13.07 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The admission to the United States of Senegalese nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Senegalese nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(l) Tanzania
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Tanzania had an overstay rate of 8.30 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 13.97 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Tanzanian nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to Tanzanian nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(m) Tonga
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Tonga had an overstay rate of 6.45 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and an overstay rate of 14.44 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Tongan nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to Tongan nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(n) Turkmenistan
(i) Since the promulgation of Proclamation 10949, Turkmenistan has maintained a productive relationship with the United States and has demonstrated significant progress in improving its identity management and information-sharing procedures. Accordingly, the restrictions imposed on Turkmenistan in this proclamation modify and supersede those set forth in section 3(f) of Proclamation 10949.
(ii) The suspension of entry into the United States of Turkmen nationals as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is lifted. Because some concerns remain, entry into the United States of Turkmen nationals as immigrants continues to be suspended.
(o) Zambia
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Zambia had an overstay rate of 10.73 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and 21.02 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The admission to the United States of Zambian nationals as immigrants and nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visas issued to Zambian nationals to the extent permitted by law.
(p) Zimbabwe
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Zimbabwe had an overstay rate of 7.89 percent for B-1/B-2 visas and 15.15 percent for F, M, and J visas.
(ii) The entry into the United States of Zimbabwean nationals as immigrants and as nonimmigrants with B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity of any other nonimmigrant visa issued to Zimbabwean nationals to the extent permitted by law.
Section 6. Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any exceptions established pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the suspensions and limitations on entry pursuant to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals from the designated countries who:
(i) are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and
(ii) do not hold a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.
(b) Exceptions. The suspension and limitation of entry pursuant to sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
(i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii) any person with dual nationality of a country designated pursuant to sections 2, 3, 4, or 5 of this proclamation when the individual is traveling with a passport issued by a country not designated as such;
(iii) any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the following classifications: A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
(iv) any athlete or member of a sports team, including coaches, persons performing a necessary support role, and immediate family members, traveling for the World Cup, the Olympic Games, or another major sporting event as determined by the Secretary of State;
(v) Special immigrant visas for employees of the United States Government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(D); and
(vi) immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.
(c) The exceptions in subsection (b) of this section modify and supersede the exceptions established in section 4(b) of Proclamation 10949 with respect to any country listed in section 2 or 3 of Proclamation 10949 from and after the date of this proclamation.
(d) Exceptions to the suspension and limitation of entry, pursuant to sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation, may be made on a case-by-case basis for individuals whose travel, the Attorney General determines in her sole discretion, would further a critical U.S. national interest affecting the Department of Justice, including when they are required to be present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses. These exceptions shall be established only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(e) Exceptions to the suspension and limitation of entry, pursuant to sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation, may be made on a case-by-case basis for individuals whose travel, in the discretion of the Secretary of State, is in the national interest of the United States. These exceptions shall be granted only by the Secretary of State or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee.
(f) Exceptions to the suspension and limitation of entry, pursuant to sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation, may be made on a case-by-case basis for persons whose travel the Secretary of Homeland Security determines, in her sole discretion, would serve a national interest of the United States. These exceptions shall be made only by the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State or his designee.
Section 7. Adjustments and Elimination of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) Within 180 days from the date of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, recommending whether the suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this proclamation should continue, be terminated, modified, or supplemented.
(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall remain in contact with each of the countries identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation—and in immediate contact with each of the countries identified in sections 4 and 5 of this proclamation—regarding the measures to be taken to comply with the United States’ screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
Section 8. Compliance. (a) The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure the efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
(b) In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued prior to the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d) This proclamation shall not apply to any person who has been granted asylum in the United States or to any refugee who has already been admitted to the country. Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed as limiting a person’s right to seek asylum, refugee status, suspension of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture, in accordance with the laws of the United States.
Section 9. Severability. It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the fullest extent possible to further U.S. national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests. Accordingly:
(a) If any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby; and
(b) If any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is deemed invalid due to the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive officer shall implement those procedural requirements to comply with existing law and any applicable court order.
Section 10. Effective Date. This proclamation takes effect at 12:01 a.m. (Eastern Time) on January 1, 2026.
Section 11. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed as impairing or otherwise affecting:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented in accordance with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to create, and does not create, any substantive or procedural right or benefit enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The costs of publishing this proclamation shall be borne by the Department of State.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this sixteenth day of December in the year of Our Lord two thousand and twenty-five, and two hundred and fiftieth of the Independence of the United States of America.
Donald J. Trump
