On December 7, 2025, Hong Kong will hold elections for its 90-seat Legislative Council (LegCo), the second under the “patriots running Hong Kong” framework introduced by Beijing in 2021.
This system drastically reduced direct elections from 35 seats (in a 70-seat body) to 20 in 10 geographical constituencies. The remaining 30 seats were filled through functional constituencies (sectoral groups such as finance and education), and 40 through an Electoral Commission dominated by pro-Beijing elites.
Only 161 candidates, all assessed for their loyalty to Beijing and the central government, ran, effectively excluding pro-democracy voices.
This followed the 2019 protests and the enactment of a 2020 national security law that dismantled opposition structures, leading to arrests, exiles, and the dissolution of parties such as the Democratic Party.
The elections were held amid the grief over the catastrophic Tai Po fire on November 25, which killed at least 159 people—the deadliest in Hong Kong in nearly 80 years—and injured dozens more.
The fire exposed building safety flaws and sparked unprecedented public outrage against the government, with demands for accountability and even the postponement of the elections. Authorities rejected the delays, viewing the vote as a test of legitimacy.
As polls closed at 10:30 p.m. HKT, final turnout figures highlighted persistent voter disengagement among the general public, though they edged above the record-low 30.2% from 2021. Registered voters totaled 4,138,992, down 8.07% from 2021 due to emigration and apathy. Breakdowns as of 22:30 HKT:
Geographical turnout varied slightly by district (e.g., 32.24% in the Southwest New Territories, 29.72% in the Northeast New Territories), but remained below pre-2021 levels (over 50%). The high turnout rate reported by the Election Commission reflects its pro-Beijing composition.
As of early December 8, the full results were still being tallied, but they were already predetermined: the pro-Beijing camp secured all 90 seats, with no opposition candidates able to stand.
The distribution among the major pro-establishment parties (based on preliminary reports and candidate lists) is expected to mirror the 2021 patterns, with the Democratic Alliance for the Improvement and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) leading with approximately 19-20 seats, followed by the Alliance of The Hong Kong Business and Professional Association (BPA) holds approximately 9 seats, the Federation of Hong Kong Trade Unions (FTU) around 7-8 seats, the New People’s Party (NPP) about 6 seats, and smaller groups such as the Liberal Party and independents filling the remainder.
Among the most notable trends is a wave of retirements of 35 sitting members (more than half of the outgoing Legislative Council), including the 12 members over 70 years old, which has injected some 107 new members into the chamber, many of them from state-owned enterprises.
This “revolving door” with national bodies such as the National People’s Congress underscores the growing integration with mainland China.
The slight increase in turnout was hailed by Chief Executive John Lee as a “crucial vote for reform,” but analysts view it as a failure to inspire broad participation, indicating apathy or silent protest among pro-democracy supporters (historically around 100%). 50% of the electorate).
Reactions on social media labeled the process a “farce” or “CCP selection,” with accusations of foreign interference against critics such as exiled activist Benedict Rogers.
The tragedy dominated the discourse, with a low-key campaign and polling stations near the site attracting mourners. It amplified criticism of governance, as the fire exposed regulatory failures in older public housing, home to many low-income residents.
At least 29 arrests were made for “inciting abstention” or damaging posters, illustrating post-crisis crackdown tactics taken from Beijing’s playbook.
Emigration (more than 500,000 since 2019) and youth disillusionment persist, eroding Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” appeal. Freedom House rated the city “Not Free” in 2025, citing risks to its status as a financial center amid from international scrutiny.
The new Legislative Council, even more aligned with Beijing, will likely accelerate pro-centralization policies, including the expansions of Article 23 of the national security law (passed in March 2024) and integration initiatives. The unanimous passage of 16 to 24 bills annually with minimal debate is expected, as seen previously. Retirements have opened up space for those loyal to the “national selection,” reducing internal friction.
Lee promised a bill in the first session for victim assistance and security reforms, which could close loopholes in building codes. However, without opposition scrutiny, these measures could prioritize image over systemic change, risking future crises.
Low voter turnout could encourage further repressive measures, but pent-up anger (for example, over housing affordability and security laws) threatens sporadic unrest.
Internationally, this strains relations with the West, and groups like the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China denounce the vote as “neither free nor fair.” Economically, the loss of confidence could accelerate capital flight, challenging Hong Kong’s role as a global gateway.
These elections consolidate Beijing’s iron grip on Hong Kong’s governance, transforming the Legislative Council from a contentious forum into an automatic control body and fulfilling the “stability” objective of the 2021 reforms at the expense of democracy.
The modest increase in turnout avoids an immediate embarrassment, but underscores a deep public disenchantment—exacerbated by the trauma of the fire—rather than support.
While short-term consequences include targeted aid and increased security, long-term risks loom: the erosion of legitimacy could undermine social cohesion and economic vitality, potentially forcing Beijing to make concessions to avoid a slow-developing legitimacy crisis.
Genuine reform would require restoring pluralism, but current trajectories point toward greater assimilation into mainland China by 2047. As one observer on X quipped, this is a “mask of maximum control,” where stability masks fragility.
