The “Signalgate” controversy: Pete Hegseth’s use of Signal and the Inspector General’s findings
Yes, the statement he provided closely matches the findings of a classified report by the Pentagon’s Inspector General (IG), submitted to Congress on December 2, 2025, and expected to be publicly available, in redacted versions, starting December 4.
The investigation, dubbed “Signalgate,” arose from incidents in March 2025 in which Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth shared details of impending US military strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen via the encrypted, but unclassified, messaging app, Signal.
Signal. While Hegseth maintains that he did not share classified information, the IG report concludes that his actions violated Department of Defense (DoD) regulations and created operational security risks.
What was shared? Hegseth shared operational details in at least two Signal group chats, including:
U.S. fighter jet takeoff and target impact times. Attack choreography, such as the assets involved and the sequence of attacks.
These details originated from a secure government email sent by the then-leader of U.S. Central Command, General Michael Kurilla, and classified (Secret/NOFORN, meaning foreign nationals could not view it).
Official chat (18 members): This included key figures in the Trump administration, such as Vice President J.D. Vance, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe. Jeffrey Goldberg, an editor at The Atlantic, was accidentally added, leading to the leak.
Personal chat: Shared with Hegseth’s wife (not a Pentagon employee), his brother, and his personal attorney.
Hegseth risked “compromising classified military information, which could have endangered U.S. troops and mission objectives.”
There is no evidence that he formally declassified the information, despite his authority as Secretary of Defense.
He violated Department of Defense policies regarding the use of commercial applications for official business and record keeping (the messages were not properly archived).
He declined an interview with the Inspector General and submitted written responses.
The report indicates that an “operational decision” was made, but lacks supporting documentation. No criminal charges are mentioned, but it could prompt congressional oversight or calls for his resignation.
Signal’s end-to-end encryption is robust, but it is not approved by the Department of Defense for classified information.
Human error (e.g., accidental additions) and the lack of archiving increase the risks. Experts point out that this could make Hegseth a prime target for espionage, especially amid attacks on Chinese telecommunications.
If adversaries were to intercept the information, the lives of the pilots and the success of the mission would be at stake, reminiscent of past leaks that jeopardized operations.
Hegseth’s defense: It claims an “operational decision” to declassify/share information for family peace of mind, but no record supports this.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell has denied the use of Signal on government devices.
Critics (e.g., Democrats like Senator Mark Kelly) are calling it a “violation” and demanding accountability.
His supporters dismiss it as a “weak operation” or bureaucratic overreach, arguing that Hegseth’s declassification powers protect him and that he is “winning” against the threats.
Left-leaning users are vehemently calling for his resignation, while right-leaning users portray it as a media attack or an attack originating from Washington, D.C.
This is not an isolated case: Hegseth’s tenure has been under scrutiny for other matters, such as a controversial attack in the Caribbean and the attendance of family members at classified briefings.
The full public report will clarify further, but it corroborates the primary risk to troops and objectives that you described. If you have any specific points of view (e.g., legal implications or comparisons with previous Secretaries of Defense), please let me know so we can explore them further.
