Main Differences Between China and Japan on Taiwan
China and Japan hold fundamentally divergent positions on Taiwan, based on history, international agreements, and strategic interests.
China’s Position: Beijing strictly adheres to the “One China” principle, considering Taiwan an inalienable part of its territory, which must be reunified, even by force if necessary.
It opposes any form of Taiwanese independence or foreign interference, considering Taiwan an essential internal matter. China has not ruled out military action and frequently conducts exercises near the island to reaffirm its claims.
Tokyo officially recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China under the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, in which it “fully understands and respects” Beijing’s position on Taiwan, but does not explicitly endorse China’s claim of sovereignty over the island. Japan does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but it does have strong unofficial relations, including economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges.
Japan emphasizes the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for its own security, given Taiwan’s proximity (just 110 km from the Japanese island of Yonaguni) and its role in vital maritime routes for energy imports.
Under the 2015 security legislation, Japan can exercise collective self-defense if a conflict threatens its survival, even if it is not directly attacked.
These differences have intensified recently. In November 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi explicitly stated that a Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan could constitute an “existential threat” to Japan, potentially triggering military intervention under the principle of collective self-defense.
While Japan insists this is consistent with its long-standing policy and maintains a “strategic ambiguity” (similar to that of the United States), China considers it a provocative move that interferes in its internal affairs and violates the spirit of bilateral political documents.
The divergence has profound repercussions in the areas of security, the economy, diplomacy, and the region, exacerbated by tensions leading up to 2025.
In general, the short-term consequences of Takaichi’s statements have been strong economic coercion by China and a diplomatic blockade, but without military confrontation. In the long term, it accelerates Japan’s remilitarization and the integration of its alliances, deterring China but increasing the risk of escalation.
The Taiwan issue remains the biggest sticking point in China-Japan relations, combining historical grievances (for example, Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan between 1895 and 1945), geopolitical realities, and great power competition.
China’s uncompromising “One China” principle clashes with Japan’s growing view that Taiwan’s fate is inextricably linked to its own survival, driven by geography, alliance obligations with the United States, and democratic values.
While economic interdependence and diplomatic channels prevent a complete rupture, persistent differences increase the likelihood of a crisis.
A contingency in Taiwan would almost certainly activate joint security mechanisms between the United States and Japan, with Japan providing crucial support (bases, rear-guard logistics), even if it does not participate directly in combat.
This constantly evolving dynamic strengthens deterrence against Chinese coercion, but it also increases risks: missteps could trigger a wider conflict.
Ultimately, sustainable stability requires dialogue on crisis management and restraint, although current trends—the explicit linking of Taiwan to Japan’s security and China’s assertive responses—point toward a more confrontational balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Peaceful resolution remains in the interest of all parties, but the gap between Beijing’s red lines and Tokyo’s strategic imperatives continues to widen.
